Antitrust law : economic theory and common law evolution / Keith N. Hylton.
By: Hylton, Keith N.Material type: BookCall no.: KF1649 .H94 2010 Publication: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010Description: xvi, 413 p. : ill.Notes: Reprint. Originally published: 2003.ISBN: 9780521790314 (hardback); 9780521793780 (pbk.).Subject(s): Antitrust law -- United States | Antitrust law -- Economic aspects
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Reprint. Originally published: 2003.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Economics. Definitions ; Perfect competition versus monopoly ; Further topics -- Law and policy. Some interpretations issues ; Enacting the antitrust law ; What should antitrust law aim to do? -- Enforcement. Optimal enforcement theory ; Enforcement provision of the antitrust laws ; Appendix -- Cartels. Cartels ; Conscious parallelism ; Conclusion -- Development of Section 1 doctrine. The Sherman Act versus the common law ; Rule of reason and per-se rule ; Conclusion -- Rule of reason and per-se rule. The case for price-fixing ; Per-se and rule of reason analysis: further developments ; Per-se versus rule of reason tests: understanding the Supreme Court's justification for the per-se rule -- Agreement. The development of inference doctrine ; Rejection of unilateral contract theory -- Facilitating mechanisms. Data dissemination cases ; Basing point pricing and related practices ; Basing point pricing: economics -- Boycotts. Pre-Socony ; Post-Socony ; Post-BMI/Sylvania ; Conclusion -- Monopolization. Development of Section 2 doctrine ; Leveraging and essential facility cases ; Predatory pricing ; Conclusion -- Power. Measuring market power ; Determinants of market power ; Substitutability and the relevant market: cellophane ; Multi-market monopoly and the relevant market: Alcoa ; Measuring power: guidelines -- Attempts. The Swift formula and modern doctrine ; Dangerous probability requirement -- Vertical restraints. Resale price maintenance ; Vertical nonprice restraints ; Manufacturer retains title ; Agreement -- Tying and exclusive dealing. Introduction ; Early cases ; Development of the per-se rule ; Tension between rule of reason arguments and per-se rule ; Technological tying ; Exclusive dealing ; Appendix -- Horizontal Mergers. Reasons for merging and implications for law ; Horizontal merger law ; Conclusion ; Appendix -- Mergers, vertical and conglomerate. Vertical mergers ; Conglomerate mergers ; Concluding remarks -- Antitrust and the state. Noerr-Pennington doctrine ; Parker doctrine ; Some final comments: error costs and immunity doctrines.
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